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Abstract
Paradigms and revolutions are popular concepts in science studies and beyond, yet their
meaning is notoriously vague and their existence is widely disputed. Drawing on recent
developments in agent-based modeling and scientometric data this paper offers a precise
conceptualization of paradigms and their dynamics, as well as a number of hypotheses that
could in principle be used to test for the existence of scientific revolutions in scientometric
data.
Introduction
In his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Thomas Kuhn (1970), a Harvard con-
densed matter physicist (PhD 1949), described science as what could today be called a
“complex adaptive system”. Kuhn described science as a process characterized by pre-
paradigmatic, normal and revolutionary patterns emerging from the interactions of its compo-
nent scientists.(De Langhe 2013) Today it is commonplace to study complex adaptive systems
using combinations of agent-based simulation and very large datasets.(Miller & Page 2007)
Yet in Kuhn’s time the tools, theories and datasets to articulate this view were still in their
infancy. For lack of statistical data to study systemic patterns in science, scholars inspired by
Kuhn (including the early Kuhn himself) took recourse to the historical record and looked for
patterns in historical case-studies instead. This might explain why Kuhn’s popular image of
science has mostly been critically received by professional philosophers. Secondary literature
on Kuhn identifies key weaknesses in every major aspect of Kuhn’s view: no clear mechanism
for rationality and progress is laid out (Sharrock & Read 2003), the core concepts allow for
too many alternative interpretations (Masterman 1970) and evidential support is indirect:
particular historical case studies are supposed to support claims about general patterns in
science. Kuhn himself later even called historical case-studies “misleading” (Kuhn 2000, 111)
because their study only deepens the problems they suggest rather than solving them. In a
paper titled ’The Trouble with the Historical Philosophy of Science’ he writes that “many of
the most central conclusions we drew from the historical record can be derived instead from
first principles”(Kuhn 2000, 112) and these principles “are necessary characteristics of any
developmental or evolutionary process”(Kuhn 2000, 119). Kuhn even had plans to publish a
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book on such an evolutionary theory of scientific discovery. Unfortunately Kuhn passed away
and the book was never finished.1 Altough all but non-existent in his time, already in the
second edition of Structure in 1970 Kuhn had asserted the relevance scientometric datasets
could one day have for the verification of his claims.2
“for this purpose [the purpose of detecting paradigms] one must have recourse to
attendance at special conferences, to the distribution of draft manuscripts or galley
proofs prior to publication, and above all to formal and informal communication
networks including those discovered in correspondence and in the linkages among
citations. I take it that the job can and will be done”(Kuhn 1970, 177-8, my italics)
Although there is a vast secondary literature on Kuhn, most of it was written in the 1970s
and 1980s. More recent contributions have interpreted Kuhn using concepts from philosophy
(Hoyningen-Huene 1993), the cognitive sciences (Andersen, Barker, & Chen 2006), evolution-
ary biology (Wray 2011) or political sciences (Fuller 2001). The once massive interest3 in
Structure began to stall in the 1990’s, paradoxically right at the time when scientometric
datasets started to become widely available thanks to the digitization of scientific research
and methods for the study of complex adaptive systems started to mature, for example at
the Santa Fe Institute (Arthur 1994, Holland 1998). Save some exceptions, development of
agent-based modeling and the widespread availablility of scientometric datasets has only very
recently sparked renewed interest in the work of Kuhn. Roughly this work is either theoreti-
cal (Chen 2012, Chen et al. 2009, Sterman 1985, Sterman & Wittenberg 1999) with a call on
bibliometricians to operationalize their concepts[4], or empirical (Moravcsik and Murugesan
(1979),Radicchi, Fortunato, and Castellano (2008), Mazloumian, Eom, Helbing, Lozano, and
Fortunato (2011), L. Bettencourt, Kaiser, and Kaur (2009), L. Bettencourt and Kaur (2011),
M. Bettencourt and Kaiser (2015)) calling on theoreticians to provide a theoretical frame-
work.[5] [6] This paper takes an opposite approach. Instead of doing detailed theoretical work
and calling on empiricists to complement it (or vice versa), I present in this paper a simple yet
general approach with the potential to explain a number of macroscopic empirical patterns
such as why scientific activity clusters in fields, why these fields are larger in some areas and
smaller or even barely existing in others and why the structure of scientific fields changes
through time. By keeping the model simple but general, it is conceived rather as a standard
1Kuhn had appointed James Conant and the late John Haugeland to finish the manuscript.(Nickles 2003)
Even twenty years after Kuhn’s death the book is still “forthcoming” according to James Conant and Chicago
University Press.
2On page 178 Kuhn (1970) references an early book by his friend Eugene Garfield (1964) who would come
to be known as one of the founders of scientometrics.
3The book sold more than 1 million copies making it one of the most widely distributed philosophical books
in the world.
4Bibliometric techniques could be used to determine how long a research problem (“puzzle”) has gone un-
solved and gauge the number of researchers working on it, to yield a measure of the difficulty of puzzles.(Sterman
& Wittenberg 1999)
5Finally, from a more theoretical point of view, an interesting goal for future work is to understand the
origin of the universality found and how its precise functional form comes about. (Radicchi et al. 2008)
6The existence of a general theory and detailed model that describes the formation of scientific fields across
disciplines, time, and population size would provide a new comprehensive, quantitative, and predictive frame-
work with which to understand the social and conceptual dynamics that drive the self-organized creation of
scientific communities. Such a framework would be of significant interest to scientists and would hold great
promise for guiding science policy.(M. Bettencourt & Kaiser 2015)
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for further theoretical and empirical refinement within a framework that already connects the
theoretical and empirical. This approach is a result of my broader, mixed ambition to find
evidence for the existence of scientific revolutions in scientometric data. I believe this would
constitute a major theoretical result achieved by empirical means.
The paper will consist of two parts. In the first two sections I build an agent-based model
to show how the interactions of individual scientists could possibly result in Kuhnian patterns
of science. In the second part I turn to the question how the results of this agent-based model
could in principle be operationalized to hunt for scientific revolutions in scientometric data.
1 Assumptions: learning, bounded rationality, evolution
Traditional philosophy of science had considered the institutions of science as given. With
stable preferences (textbooks), rationality (the Scientific Method) and equilibrium (truth) the
existence of successful science is straightforward. Conceiving of science as a complex system,
Kuhn contrasted this traditional view which assumed a given method, clear values and a fixed
goal with his own view in which the institutions of science are endogenous, viz. the rules of
the game are made as they go along, emerging and declining as a result of the very activity
they regulate.7 In contrast to a traditional approach assuming stable preferences, rationality
and equilibrium Thomas Kuhn developed a “new image of science” (Kuhn 1970, 3) based on
learning, bounded rationality and evolution.8
Without the strong traditional assumptions which do not explain but simply presuppose
scientists’ coordination on the rules of the game, the challenge for Kuhn is to explain how
successful coordinated research efforts can emerge from nothing but the local interactions of
agents through time. Thomas Kuhn called such successful coordination a paradigm. Work
within a paradigm is an “attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by
professional education.” (Kuhn 1970, 5) The function of a paradigm is to allow scientific
contributions to be aggregated over scientists and cumulated over time. This “roster of
unsolved puzzles” (Kuhn 1970, 184) acts as a standard for the division of labor in science
(Kuhn 1977a, 186), a virtual assembly line as it were determining -just like a real assembly
line- the expected end result and how the work is parcelled. Like in real factories, coordination
on a virtual assembly line allows specialization, a powerful catalyst of scientific progress. A
characteristic aspect of Kuhn’s work is that he is interested in the social aspect of science
only in as far as it is epistemic. Specialization resulting from scientific coordination is a
social factor of science, but conducive to scientific progress. An important difference between
the view of social cooperation along social network lines and along virtual assembly lines is
that for the latter, just as in real assembly lines, once converted to the same assembly line
cooperation among its members does not require social ties but can be mediated through
7According to Kuhn there is “a feedback loop through which theory change affects the values which led to
that change” (Kuhn 1977a, 336).
8“Sketching the needed reconceptualization, I’ve indicated three of its main aspects. First, that what
scientists produce, and evaluate is not belief tout court but change of belief, a process which I’ve argued has
intrinsic elements of circularity, but of a circularity that is not vicious. Second, that what evaluation aims to
select is not beliefs that correspond to a so-called real external world, but simply the better or best of the
bodies of belief actually present to the evaluators at the time their judgments are reached. [...] And, finally, I’ve
suggested that the plausibility of this view depends upon abandoning the view of science as a single, monolithic
enterprise, bound by a unique method. Rather, it should be seen as a complex but unsystematic structure of
distinct specialties or species, each responsible for a different domain of phenomena”(Kuhn 2000, 119)
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exemplars, exemplary contributions which embody the standard for dividing labor. Scientists
within the same paradigm can add to each other’s work without knowing each other socially.
Note how this interpretation of social ties departs from much of the received literature on
social dynamics of science which takes the social network structure of science as a baseline
for the diffusion of scientific knowledge.(Sun, Kaur, Milojevic, Flammini, & Menczer 2013)
Interpreting paradigms as virtual assembly lines allows to connect Kuhn’s conceptual frame-
work to citation data and will prove useful further in the paper for operationalizing some of
the observable consequences drawn from the model. What does it mean to cite a paper?9 In
Kuhn’s view, virtual assembly lines emerge from the contributions scientists make to them.
This is possible only if scientists have a way of signaling to each other what paradigm their
paper is part of. For Kuhn this is the function of citations. He saw citations as a means to
anchor a paper in a paradigm. A citation is then not a positive endorsement of the specific
content of a paper, but more generally an indication that the cited paper asks the same kind
of questions and has similar criteria for what counts as a satisfactory answers. Paradigms
might then be observed by detecting overlaps in cited references that cannot be explained by
chance alone. The idea of using co-citation networks to observe paradigms and revolutions is
itself not new.(Small 2003)10Very recently Uzzi, Mukherjee, Stringer, and Jones (2013) have
developed a quantitative measure based on the analysis of pairwise combinations of references
in the bibliography. Any reference pair in a bibliography can be assigned a z-score. Z-scores
above zero indicate pairs that appeared more often in the observed data than expected by
chance, indicating their conventionality. Conversely a z-score below zero indicates novelty.
Using this method, any paper can be ranked on a continuum from explorative to exploitative
(or “novel” and “conventional” as they call it) by calculating the median value of the z-scores
of the reference pairs in its bibliography.11
Paradigms have been identified as a mode of scientific cooperation that does not require an
explicit social tie such as co-authorship or belonging to the same team.12 Paradigms can then
be identified as clusters of papers exhibiting positive z-scores and overlapping reference pairs.
For example research at CERN takes place within a very strict division of labor characterized
by a well-defined research context. This is what Kuhn calls “normal science”. Normal science
is characterized by very clear research questions, methodology and expectations. Papers in
such a context are expected to share more common reference pairs than expected by chance.
By contrast revolutionary papers that rely less on existing tradition but instead are the basis of
a new one are expected to be characterized by non-overlapping reference pairs and negative
z-scores. The evolution of paradigms would result in empirically observable shifts or even
dissolutions of the overlapping citations pairs in new papers. Even though citation data was
all but non-existent in his time, Kuhn is remarkably explicit about this prospect for empirical
observation of paradigms and revolutions in scientometric data:
“if I am right that each scientific revolution alters the historical perspective of
the community that experiences it, then that change of perspective should affect
9For general reviews of the literature on the meaning of citations, see Bornmann and Daniel (2008) and
Leydesdorff (1998).
10For a different approach to observing scientific revolutions in scientometric data, see Marx and Bornmann
(2013).
11For another application of Uzzi et al. (2013), Lee, Walsh, and Wang (2015) use its method to test the
effects of team size and variety on creativity
12For an analysis of novelty and impact in teams, see Lee et al. (2015)
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the structure of postrevolutionary textbooks and research publications. One such
effect -a shift in the distribution of technical literature cited in the footnotes to
research reports- ought to be studied as a possible index to the occurrence of
revolutions.”(Kuhn 1970, xi, my italics)
2 Agent-Based Model
A paradigm is a state of coordination over what the questions should be and what counts as
a solution. This state of coordination emerges from the individual contributions of scientists.
The more scientists coordinate on the same standard, the larger the paradigm. The rise
and fall of a paradigm can then be conceived as the dynamics of adoption of a standard,
analogous to the dynamics of adoption of technological standards.(Arthur 1989, De Langhe
& Greiff 2010) Paradigms emerge and dissolve as a result of the collective action of individual
scientists. Kuhn failed to spell out how the different aspects of his image of science were
connected. He was never able to specify exactly how successful science as we know it emerges
from the individual-level interactions between scientists as Kuhn had characterized them.
“Even those who have followed me this far will want to know how a value-based
enterprise of the sort I have described can develop as a science does, repeatedly
producing powerful new techniques for prediction and control. To that question,
unfortunately, I have no answer at all [....] The lacuna is one I feel acutely”(Kuhn
1977a, 332-3)
To understand how paradigms can possibly emerge and dissolve from the interactions of
individual agents requires an agent-based approach which was unavailable at the time Kuhn
wrote Structure. In this section I specify an incentive structure based on just two general,
qualitative assumptions and heuristic rules for individual decision making.13 I show that
these two very general assumptions are sufficient to produce the aggregate patterns Kuhn
described. This is done while remaining within the confines of the Kuhnian assumptions
described in the previous section.
2.1 Learning: exploration and exploitation
If standards are not universal but learnt, then multiple standards are possible. As a result
the incentive structure for individual scientists is governed by the fundamental dilemma be-
tween dividing labor over the standard they know or looking for new and potentially better
standards. This tradeoff between exploration and exploitation plays a central role in any
organizational learning process (March 1991). Thomas Kuhn (1977b) himself called this the
“essential tension” between tradition and innovation. 14 According to Kuhn this essential
13See also ? for an anlysis of this model.
14“This central role of an elaborate and often esoteric tradition is what I have principally had in mind when
speaking of the essential tension in scientific research. I do not doubt that the scientist must be, at least
potentially, an innovator, that he must possess mental flexibility, and that he must be prepared to recognize
troubles where they exist. That much of the popular stereotype is surely correct [...] But what is no part of
our stereotype and what appears to need careful integration with it is the other face of this same coin. We
are, I think, more likely fully to exploit our potential scientific talent if we recognize the extent to which the
basic scientist must also be a firm traditionalist” (Kuhn 1977b, 239, my italics)
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tension between exploration and exploitation is key both for the incentive structure within
which agents operate as well as the heuristics they use to navigate it:
“we must seek to understand how these two superficially discordant modes of prob-
lem solving can be reconciled both within the individual and within the group.”
(Kuhn 1977b, 239)
The incentive for exploiting the same standard for division of labor is specialization. 15 United
on the same standard scientists can:
“pursue selected phenomena in far more detail, designing much special equip-
ment for the task and employing it more stubbornly and systematically” (Kuhn
1970, 18)
“So long as the tools a paradigm supplies continue to prove capable of solving
the problems it defines, science moves fastest and penetrates most deeply through
confident employment of those tools. The reason is clear. As in manufacture so in
science - retooling is an extravagance to be reserved for the occasion that demands
it.” (Kuhn 1970, 76)
The incentive for exploration is innovation. If no scientist ever explored new possible stan-
dards for dividing scientific labor, science would lock in to a (potentially suboptimal) standard
and scientific progress would be impossible. The ongoing tension between exploitation and ex-
ploration is the result of the fact that exploitation causes exploration and vice versa: “research
under a paradigm must be a particularly effective way of inducing paradigm change.”(Kuhn
1970, 52)
The dynamic tension between exploration and exploitation is modeled as follows. Con-
sider a community of N (1, . . . , n) scientists. Each turn, each scientist makes a contribution
C (c1, . . . , cN ) to a paradigm S (s1, . . . , sM ); note that N is a constant of the system, how-
ever, M may vary as the system evolves. To reconstruct the incentive structure characterized
by the essential tension between exploration and exploitation I will make two very simple
but general qualitative assumptions, namely that the utility of making a contribution to a
paradigm increases with adoption (because of specialization) and decreases with production
(because of diminishing innovativeness).
Adoption A of a paradigm s at time t is the sum of the number of scientists that contribute
to it at time t.
As(t) =
∑
ai,s(t). (1)
15Kuhn illustrates the benefits of specialization for the electricians using the Franklinian paradigm: “Freed
from the concern with any and all electrical phenomena, the united group of electricians could pursue selected
phenomena in far more detail, designing much special equipment for the task and employing it more stubbornly
and systematically than electricians had ever done before. Both fact collection and theory articulation became
highly directed activities. The effectiveness and efficiency of electrical research increased accordingly” (Kuhn
1970, 18)
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Production P of a paradigm s is the sum of all contributions ever made to that paradigm.
Assuming for simplicity that all agents make a single contribution each turn production is
the sum of adopters through time t:
Ps(t) =
t′=t∑
t′=0
As(t
′) (2)
Note that the relation between adoption and production as defined in the model reproduce
the tension between exploration and exploitation. A contribution to a paradigm will increase
(in the short term) and decrease (in the long term) the value of contributions made to it.
Hence research under a paradigm is both attractive but at the same time effectively inducing
paradigm change.
If the parameter α denotes the output elasticity of coordination, the utility of the next
contribution to a paradigm within this incentive structure can then be expressed as:
Us(t) =
(As(t) + 1)
α
Ps(t) + 1
. (3)
A paradigm is a standard for dividing labor in science. Division of labor enables specialization
and hence scientific progress. The more scientists adopt the same standard for dividing labor,
the more specialization is possible. The parameter α represents the increase in specialization
allowed by an increase in adoption. Not all domains of scientific inquiry allow for the same
amount of specialization, because the technology for standardization has not yet been devel-
oped (e.g. biology before the invention of the microscope) or because their ontology is too
diverse. More ontological homogeneity makes it easier to specialize, just as more generally
standardization of tools and components is a condition of possibility for division of labor. In
this model this parameter is therefore a property of the entire community. For the purpose
of this paper α is exogenous. The value of α affects the incentive to exploit.
2.2 Bounded rationality: persuasion game
Confronted with the incentive structure characterized in the previous section, individual
agents face a decision problem between exploiting their current paradigm or exploring a new
one. “The successful scientist must simultaneously display the characteristics of the tradi-
tionalist and of the iconoclast.”(Kuhn 1977b, 227) This entails three important consequences
for individual decision making.
First, the decision between exploitation and exploration is analytically intractable because
the choice set, all possible paradigms, is undefined. Moreover agents cannot evaluate stan-
dards directly against each other (incommensurability) because their specific characteristics
are themselves what is used for evaluation: “the choice is not and cannot be determined
merely by the evaluative procedures characteristic of normal science, for these depend in part
upon a particular paradigm, and that paradigm is at issue.”(Kuhn 1970, 94) These character-
istics of the individual decision process Kuhnian agents face have prompted many critics to
declare that Kuhnian agents must be irrational16 and hence science for Kuhn is only a matter
16See for example Popper (1970), Scheﬄer (1982) and Shapere (1984)
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of “mob psychology” (Lakatos 1970) or “a political and propagandistic affair” (Laudan 1977).
Yet this early wave of criticism was probably exaggerated. In many domains even in our daily
lives we make successful decisions under uncertainty. We manage to do this not by brute-force
calculations but on the basis of heuristics.(Gigerenzer 2000) A heuristic only tells agents how
to look, not what to find. Thus it guides the decision process without determining it. It is
less specified than an algorithm, but it is this lack of specificity which makes it robust against
choice for unknown alternatives. As such, heuristics are not inferior to algorithms, but a dif-
ferent solution to a different problem. In response to his critics Kuhn therefore specified that
in his view paradigm choice is based on heuristic values rather than on an algorithm, which
he described as “criteria that influence decisions without specifying what those decisions must
be.”(Kuhn 1977a, 330) He named five: accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity and fruitful-
ness. Although paradigms cannot be compared against each other using paradigmspecific
attributes, the exploration/exploitation incentive structure nevertheless allows to value them
because its evaluation is based on non-paradigmspecific attributes, viz. attributes that any
paradigm will have regardless of its content: adoption, production and an output elasticity
of coordination. Kuhn’s five heuristic values can be projected on the variables. Adoption can
account for accuracy because adoption determines the extent of division of labor and hence
the extent of specialization. Production can account for consistency and simplicity because
production determines the amount of articulation of a paradigm. The output elasticity of co-
ordination can account for scope and fruitfulness. This projection of Kuhn’s values onto the
essential tension between exploration and exploitation (adoption and production) captures
Kuhn’s suggestion that values conflict. (Kuhn 1977a, 321)
Apart from incommensurability scientists also face practical limitations. They do not have
perfect information. Tracking ongoing work in their paradigm is a costly investment. Scien-
tists cannot simply be assumed to track ongoing work in other paradigms as well. In fact,
whether or not to start tracking ongoing work in other paradigms is part of the question un-
der consideration when choosing between exploration and exploitation. For this reason I will
assume that scientists only know adoption, production and output elasticity of coordination
for their own paradigm (this captures Kuhnian incommensurability) in their own (Moore)
neighborhood (this captures Kuhn’s suggestion that scientific values are weighed differently
in different contexts.(Kuhn 1977a, 321))
Finally, decision-making by scientists acting within the exploration/exploitation incentive
structure is forward-looking. Not backward-looking choosing among existing theories, but
forward-looking possibly also searching for new theories. They must find “the fittest way
to practice future science”(Kuhn 1970, 172) decide based not on information about previous
contributions but based on the expected value of their own prospective contribution to a
paradigm. What counts is therefore not the value of the last contribution to a paradigm in
terms of adoption and production, but that of the next one (current adoption and production
+1).
Kuhn described shifts in paradigm allegiance as a conversion experience driven by the efforts
of individual scientists to persuade each other.(Kuhn 1970, 152) Within the exploration/ex-
ploitation incentive structure it makes sense to want to persuade others to join one’s paradigm
because (at least in the short term) the benefit of increased specialization outweighs the disad-
vantage of increased production. The incentive structure characterized in the previous section
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and the three considerations in this section allow to make a precise specification of a Kuhnian
“persuasion game”. Assume each agent tries to persuade one of its 8 (Moore) neighbors each
turn. Despite the incommensurable, perspectival and forward-looking nature of paradigm
choice, precise probabilities can be assigned to any possible action in any possible context
of such actions by others: 1) persuasion fails; the target sticks to its paradigm i (Ps), 2)
persuasion succeeds; the target is converted to paradigm j (Pc) and 3) persuasion mutation;
the targeted is converted to a new paradigm k (Pn).
Ps =
Usi
Usi + Usj + 1
, (4)
Pc =
Usj
Usi + Usj + 1
, (5)
Pn =
1
Usi + Usj + 1
. (6)
Each agent only knows the value of the next contribution to its own paradigm. For this
reason values are not compared directly and agents cannot simply choose that contribution
with the highest value. Rather the probability of persuasion depends on the relative value of
each alternative. Put intuitively, the persuasion power of an agent depends on how valuable
the next contribution to its paradigm will be relative to the next contribution of the target’s
paradigm and creating a new paradigm. For example if an agent adopting a paradigm to which
the next contribution is worth 66 within the exploration/exploitation incentive structure tries
to convert an agent adopting a paradigm which for that agent is worth 33, the probability
of conversion is 66%, the probability conversion fails is 33% and the probability that a new
paradigm emerges is 1%. Note that there is a non-zero probability that a new paradigm is
created. As a result paradigms are endogenous. The number of paradigms in the model is
not specified in advance but a function of the interaction of agents as the model runs. The
endogeneity of the number of paradigms is a powerful feature of this model. In fact in the
exploitation/exploration incentive structure the value of a contribution to a new paradigm
is always exactly 1 because a new paradigm has no adoption (A = 0) and no production
(P = 0). So the next contribution will bring both adoption and production to 1, which
according to equation 3 always results in a value of 1/1 = 1 regardless of α. As a consequence
the probability that an entirely new paradigm emerges from a persuasion attempt will vary
inversely proportional to the value of existing paradigms. Thus the system self-regulates to
find a dynamic balance between the exploitation of existing paradigms and the exploration
of new paradigms.
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2.3 Evolution
In pseudocode, the model runs as follows.17
SETUP:
Two-dimensional grid of size N = L2
Let each patch be a scientist
Let the color of each patch represent the paradigm to which that scientist currently
contributes
Create N scientists
Let all scientists make a contribution to a randomly selected paradigm
RUN:
Ask N randomly assigned agents to be persuaded by one of their neighbors with the
probability of success (conversion), fail and mutation given by 4, 5 and 6. Agents only
change paradigm if they are persuaded by an adopter of another paradigm to do so.
All scientists make one contribution to the paradigm of their choice; their color changes
accordingly.
Figure 1 shows a few typical runs of the model for various values of α. A few observations can
already be made. Paradigms as geographically concentrated pockets of coordination emerge,
move, decline, split up and disappear again. The structure of the community changes as α
increases. The number of paradigms decreases as the incentive for exploitation (α) increases.
Although there is no limit to the creation of new paradigms, paradigms are only created as
existing ones are exhausted. The model thus self-organizes to find a dynamic balance between
exploration and exploitation. Although these patterns appear to live a life of their own, they
nevertheless emerge exclusively from the local interactions of boundedly rational individuals
based on their locally available information.
3 Observable consequences
In section 1 I have introduced paradigms as virtual assembly lines that emerge together with
the contributions scientists make to them. In the previous section I have constructed an
agent-based model of how paradigms can emerge and decline as a consequence of rational
interactions between scientific agents choosing what assembly line to join. This section deals
with the question how these assembly lines and their evolution could in principle be observed
in scientometric datasets. Although other scientometric data might be relevant, for this paper
I will limit myself to citation data.
Thomas Kuhn distinguished between those areas of science in which there continue to be
a wide range of paradigmatic assumptions (“pre-paradigmatic science”) and “mature” ar-
eas of science in which some paradigmatic assumptions have become more widely adopted
than others. In mature sciences, dominance of paradigms is punctuated by periods of revo-
lutionary science. Philosophers like Toulmin (1970) argue that without a principled way to
distinguish between them, Kuhn’s entire model is jeopardized. The model of the dynamics
of scientific revolutions introduced in the previous section makes two in principle testable
predictions: a polarization between little specialized and highly specialized communities and
17The model was written using the Netlogo software package version 4.1.3
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Figure 1: Typical state of the model after 1,000 turns (left) with evolution of market share throughout
the run (right) for (from the top down) α = 2, 5, α = 5, α = 7, 5 and α = 10.
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within these highly specialized communities an alternation between periods of high exploita-
tion punctuated by periods of exploration. By explaining how patterns can emerge from
the interactions of individual agents, agent-based models allow us to better understand these
patterns and potentially even derive previously unexpected but in principle observable conse-
quences.(Bonabeau 2002, Railsback & Grimm 2011) Here I show that the agent-based model
in the previous section makes two empirical predictions by which the distinction between
pre-paradigmatic and mature science on the one hand and normal and revolutionary science
on the other could be empirically observed in scientometric data.
3.1 Pre-paradigmatic and mature science
The first consequence is that specialization in a community on a shared assembly line occurs
quite suddenly as α increases. Variation of all sizes can be observed around α = 6.5, perhaps
suggesting a critical point. Communities with α below this point are characterized by the
continuous presence of multiple competing paradigms, entailing a low level of specialization.
Communities in which α is higher are characterized by the alternating monopoly of a sin-
gle paradigm punctuated by shorter periods of crisis. Fig.2 shows that the average share
of scientists making a contribution to the dominant paradigm in their community exhibits
a cross-over from very low to very high as α increases. Around the tipping point, commu-
nities characterized by a minor difference in α are expected to exhibit large differences in
structure. The different runs for various community sizes L2 illustrate that this tipping point
for α is independent of the size of the community. Assuming a uniform random distribution
of α across scientific domains this entails a polarized scientific landscape with on the one
hand communities characterized by very low levels of specialization and on the other hand
communities characterized by very high levels of specialization, with little in between. More
precisely, in terms of Uzzi et al. (2013) (see section 1), a polarized distribution of Z-scores
is expected across science. Deviations from this prediction might be explained by variations
in the ontological homogeneity of the domains studied by scientists (or a preference among
scientists to study certain domains rather than others). Deviations can also be explained as
a result of the dataset. For example Uzzi et al. (2013) use Web of Science data. However
Web of Science makes inclusion in their database conditional on a number of requirements as
a result of which only journals from more specialized communities are included.
3.2 Normal and Revolutionary Science
The second consequence that can be derived from the agent-based model introduced in the
previous section is a difference in the distribution of the total number of contributions made
to dominant paradigms (normal science) and the total number of contributions made to
non-dominant paradigms (revolutionary science). Fig.3 shows how often it occurred that
paradigms have a total production of a certain size. The x-axis denotes the total number of
contributions C to paradigms S, the y-axis how often this number occured P(C/S) during
the run of the model (100,000 ticks). This was done for three different values of α, one for
pre-paradigmatic science (α = 5), one for mature science (α = 8) and one around the tipping
point (α = 6.5). The top row shows the distribution of total production, the second row
shows the distribution of production in non-dominant paradigms and the third row shows the
distribution in dominant paradigms.
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sions L (100,000 ticks).
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Figure 3: Top row shows distribution of total production for α = 5, 6.5, 8; L = 100 (100,000 ticks).
Middle row shows distribution of production to non-dominant paradigms (revolutionary
science), lower row to dominant paradigms (normal science). Note how the difference in
distribution between normal and revolutionary science becomes more pronounced as α
increases.
14
The distribution of total production for various values of α (top row) shows a change in
the distribution of total production as communities evolve from pre-paradigmatic to mature
science. For mature science (α = 8) the distribution of total production appears to consist
of two separate distributions, suggesting a difference in the distribution of total production
between normal science and revolutionary science. This suggestion is reinforced by the fact
that separating the distribution of total production to dominant and non-dominant paradigm
in the rows underneath is sufficient to disentangle both distributions. Revolutionary science
is characterized by a distribution of total production of a wide range of sizes. But these sizes
are typically smaller than normal science, which is characterized by a distribution that shows
less variation in but higher numbers of production. A possible explanation for this difference
in size variation is that the size of non-dominant paradigms is limited by each other’s various
sizes, while the size of a dominant paradigm is limited only by the (in this model fixed) size
of the community. A possible explanation for the higher total production is the observation
that periods of revolutionary science are typically more fragmented and shorter than periods
of normal science.
Detection of these different statistical distribution would support the distinction between
normal and revolutionary science. The model predicts that total production in normal and
revolutionary science are characterized by statistically different properties, allowing for a
quantitative separation of these phases based on the distribution of their total production.
In terms of Uzzi et al. (2013) normal science papers are characterized by high Z-scores while
revolutionary science papers have lower Z-scores. Empirical observation will require a good
proxy for the total number of contributions to a paradigm. Assuming that the total number
of citations of a paper is a proxy for the total production of the paradigm it was contributed
to, a comparison of the distribution of the total number of citations to papers with high
Z-scores and papers with low Z-scores could be used to test for the occurrence of a double
distribution in mature science. A difference in distribution would mean there are indeed two
separate phases, one normal and one revolutionary.
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